Deliveries are expected to begin reaching the market by the end of next week and will continue over approximately 120 days. The first batch of 86 million barrels has already been opened for bidding. Japan will release 80 million barrels beginning March 16, 2026.
| Event | Year | Release | Scale vs. 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| First Gulf War | 1991 | 75 mln bbl | |
| Hurricanes Katrina & Rita | 2005 | 60 mln bbl | |
| Libya Civil War | 2011 | 60 mln bbl | |
| Russia–Ukraine War | 2022 | 180 mln bbl | |
| US/Israel–Iran War ★ | 2026 | 400 mln bbl |
| IEA Region | Govt. Stocks (mln bbl) | Obligated Industry Stocks (mln bbl) | Other (mln bbl) | Crude Oil | Oil Products |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Americas | 172.2 | — | 23.6 | 100% | — |
| Asia Oceania | 66.8 | 41.8 | — | 60% | 40% |
| Europe | 32.7 | 74.8 | — | 32% | 68% |
| Total IEA | 271.7 | 116.6 | 23.6 | 72% | 28% |
US deliveries flow into the market over a 120-day window. Combined with GCC bypass pipeline capacity, the SPR mechanism limits sustained price upside. The loan structure (with repayment premium) signals a temporary buffer — markets will watch replenishment dynamics once the conflict stabilises.
The strikes on Shah gas field and Fujairah represent a direct Iranian attempt to degrade the very bypass capacity markets are relying on. Any confirmed damage to the East–West Pipeline or ADCOP would significantly narrow the 20–30 day supply offset window and push prices sharply toward — or potentially beyond — the $110/bbl ceiling.
| Period | Global Supply | Global Demand | S&D Balance |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025e | 103.57 | 102.94 | +0.63 |
| 2026p | 104.29 | 103.74 | +0.55 |
| JFM '26p | 103.80 | 103.50 | +0.30 |
| AMJ '26p | 104.40 | 103.75 | +0.65 |
| JAS '26p | 104.35 | 103.80 | +0.55 |
| OND '26p | 104.60 | 103.90 | +0.70 |
| Period | Supply | Demand | Balance |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025e | 103.57 | 102.94 | +0.63 |
| 2026p | 100.23 | 102.13 | −1.90 |
| JFM '26p | 101.80 | 102.80 | −1.00 |
| AMJ '26p | 97.10 | 101.60 | −4.50 |
| JAS '26p | 100.00 | 102.00 | −2.00 |
| OND '26p | 102.00 | 102.10 | −0.10 |
| Period | Supply | Demand | Balance |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025e | 103.57 | 102.94 | +0.63 |
| 2026p | 101.10 | 102.45 | −1.35 |
| JFM '26p | 102.10 | 103.00 | −0.90 |
| AMJ '26p | 99.10 | 102.10 | −3.00 |
| JAS '26p | 100.80 | 102.30 | −1.50 |
| OND '26p | 102.40 | 102.40 | 0.00 |
Scenario 1 (Preferred): Exchange of attacks between US/Israel and Iran continuing, leading to severe/significant/complete disruptions of crude oil and its products trade through the Strait of Hormuz, severely impacting Iraq's and Kuwait's crude oil production over the next 3 to 6 months. Full-year 2026 deficit: −1.90 MBpd. AMJ quarter most acute at −4.50 MBpd.
Scenario 2 (Alternate): Partial disruptions of crude oil trade through the Strait of Hormuz, with Iran not targeting ships and oil tankers moving toward China, India, and select Asian nations outside the Western alliance. Full-year 2026 deficit: −1.35 MBpd. Balance returns to flat by OND '26.
Movement toward — or beyond — $120/bbl is likely if: (1) Iran retaliates massively for the Larijani killing with strikes on GCC pipeline or port infrastructure, (2) confirmed damage to the Shah gas field or Fujairah zone materially disrupts UAE export capacity, (3) further tanker strikes escalate Strait of Hormuz risk, or (4) SPR drawdown confirmation is delayed. Conversely, any credible ceasefire signal or de-escalation would pull prices sharply back toward the $90–$95/bbl floor.